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ABSTRACT 
Presently, 120 states are parties to the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).  A state that one will not find on the list, however, would be the United States.  
This project examines the relationship between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
United States.  The United States took part in the negotiating process, signing the Rome 
Statute under President Bill Clinton, but was not fully satisfied with the agreement reached.  
Under President Bush, however, the Rome Statute was unsigned.  Presently, the United States 
remains unsigned on the Rome Statute.  The relationship between the Court and the United 
States is important in determining the future of the Court, in terms of effectiveness and 
legitimacy.  I will begin with a brief historical background on the development of the ICC, its 
structure, and the extent of its jurisdiction.  From there, I will detail several problems with the 
court from America’s perspective.  These include third-party jurisdiction and constitutional 
issues.  I will also examine the relationship between the United States and the ICC under the 
three Presidents in office since the court’s conception: Clinton, Bush, and Obama.  Finally, I 
argue that the Court needs the support of the United States to survive, but that the problems 
with the Court from America’s perspective will continue to stand in the way of American 
support for the court until U.S. interests are met.  
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METHODOLOGY 
To complete the project objective, I use qualitative data.  Most of my research comes in the 
form of articles, books, and primary documents, such as the Rome Statute itself.  I have 
viewed both the Rome Statute and the Constitution of the United States to see where the 
discrepancies might have come into play.  I also utilized articles about the signing and 
unsigning of the statute and the connection between the U.S. and the court.  I have researched 
articles written both before and after the unsigning of the Rome Statute. 
To begin, I dove into the background of international law.  I wanted to view the events 
leading up to the creation of the International Criminal Court.  I examined the historical 
background, as well as the structure of the Court and the crimes over which the Court retains 
jurisdiction.  From there I examined some of the main concerns of the United States to see 
why the country would not fully support the Court.  These concerns include the threat of third 
party jurisdiction, anti-American sentiment, and constitutional objections.  Following that, I 
examined how the three Presidents who have sat in office since the conception of the court—
Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama—addressed the Court during their presidencies.  I start 
with President Clinton’s signing of the Rome Statute, then President Bush’s unsigning of the 
treaty, and President Obama’s handling of the Court since the unsigning.  Finally, I wanted to 
use the information gathered to develop my own opinion on the future of the Court in terms of 
its relationship with the United States.  I argue that the Court needs the support of the United 
States in order to survive and develop, yet the United States has no incentive or interest to 
sign on to the Court presently. 
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A BACKGROUND ON THE COURT 
History of the Development of the International Criminal Court 
The road to creating an international court spanned over a century.  The first real origins of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) can be identified as early as the 1870’s when Gustave 
Moynier proposed a permanent international court following the Franco-Prussian War. His 
calls for a court were not seriously pursued by states due to the perceived threat on 
sovereignty—the ability of a nation to govern itself independently and make and enforce its 
own laws—but it planted the seed in the minds of many.  Nearly 60 years later, the world saw 
the next serious push for an international court.  Some framers of the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles envisioned the creation of an ad hoc tribunal to try the German Kaiser and other 
German war criminals following World War I.  British Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
proposed that the Allies should “hang the Kaiser.”i  This call for a court never came to 
fruition, as it was opposed by both President Woodrow Wilson of the United States and King 
George V of the United Kingdom.  Wilson strongly opposed the extradition of Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, and even though King George acknowledged that his cousin was “the greatest 
criminal in history”ii he still opposed the Prime Minister’s proposal.  The main argument for 
opposing the measure was that it would destabilize the peace they had just won in the war.iii  
Again, though, this call never became a reality, it planted the foundation for the trials that 
would follow World War II.   
Following the second World War, the Allied forces created tribunals for German and 
Japanese war crimes, known as the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, respectively.  These 
courts were meant to try the top Axis war criminals following the close of the war.  Though 
the court accomplished its goal of indicting and trying many of Germany’s top war criminals, 
many questioned the legitimacy of the tribunals.  This doubt stemmed from the fact that the 
criminals were being tried for actions that were not defined as crimes until after the end of the 
war.  This concept in domestic jurisdictions is known as ex post facto laws (laws made after 
the fact).  These trials were also referred to as “victors’ justice,” as the victors (in this case, 
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the Allied forces) only tried the “losers” of the war (the Germans).  The most serious calls for 
an international court came in 1948 from the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) 
who, after adopting the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, called for international penal tribunals to try criminals. The UN GA called for the 
International Law Commission (ILC) to identify, “…the desirability and the possibility of 
establishing an international judicial organ for the trials of persons charged with genocide.”iv   
The ILC began drafting this statute in the early 1950s.  Simultaneously, the Cold War began, 
hindering the progress toward an international court.  With two major superpowers at odds 
with each other, every issue became a political one and agreement to create an international 
court would never materialize.  The UN GA abandoned the idea until the definition of “crime 
of aggression” and an international Code of Crimes could be agreed upon.  
The next push for an international court came from an unlikely source.  In June 1989, 
Trinidad and Tobago resurrected the notion of a court in response to the prevalence of drug 
trafficking.  It resurrected the pre-existing proposal for the establishment of the court, and the 
UN GA responded by continuing its working on the statute it had started and then abandoned. 
Soon after, in the early 1990s, the UN Security Council established two separate ad hoc 
tribunals, prompted by the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo), as well as Rwanda.  These tribunals were created after the mass commission of 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide to hold individuals accountable for these 
crimes in these two conflicts.  These two major ad hoc tribunals further emphasized the need 
for a permanent international criminal court.  In the case of Rwanda, the jurisdiction of the 
UN tribunal was so limited and the case so unclear, that many of the minor cases were handed 
back to the Rwandan people to be dealt with in small, communal trials known as Gacaca 
courts.  In these trials, the community gathers to hear both the side of the victims and the side 
of the accused.  Then, as a community, they decide the fate of the accused, whether it be 
acquittal, community service, or imprisonment.  This method has been criticized for not 
protecting the rights of the victims as well as the accused, arguing that the trials are unfair due 
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to false accusations and the lack of lawyers.  Had there been a permanent court, it can be 
argued that the process would have been far quicker and fairer for both sides. 
The ILC presented the final draft of its statute to the UN GA in 1994.  It also recommended 
the creation of a conference of plenipotentiaries, which would convene to negotiate a treaty 
and enact the statute that had just been drafted.  In response to this recommendation, the UN 
GA established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court.  This committee would convene twice in 1995 to discuss major substantive issues in 
the draft statute.  The committee then submitted a report to the UN GA following its 
meetings.   
The UN GA considered the committee’s report, and created the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of the ICC to prepare a consolidated draft text.  Between 1996 and 1998, the 
Preparatory Committee convened for six sessions at the UN headquarters in New York.  
Contributing input to the discussion were many non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
They attended the meetings under the umbrella of the NGO Coalition for an ICC (NICC).  
They submitted hundreds of documents to the Preparatory Committee for consideration 
during the six sessions.   
In January 1998, the Bureau and the coordinators of the Preparatory Committee convened in 
the Netherlands for an Inter-Sessional meeting to consolidate and edit the draft articles into a 
draft.  The draft, known as the Zutphen draft and consisted of 99 articles, showed a clear lack 
of agreement, as it was heavily bracketed.  The draft compiled at the Inter-Sessional meeting 
was submitted to the Preparatory Committee at their March-April 1998 session.  The draft 
submitted here was the basis of the draft to be considered at the Rome Conference.  Based on 
this draft, the UN GA held a convention at the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an ICC to “finalize and adopt a convention on the establishment”v of 
an international criminal court. 
Between June 15 and July 17, 1998, delegations from 160 countries convened in Rome, Italy 
for the Rome Conference.  The NGO Coalition was also in attendance, monitoring the 
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discussions and negotiations, distributing information worldwide, and facilitating the 
participation of more than 200 NGOs.  By the end of the conference, 5 weeks later, 120 
nations voted favorably for the adoption of the Rome Statute.  Only 7 nations voted 
unfavorably for the Rome Statute: China, Israel, Iraq, Qatar, Libya, Yemen, and the United 
States of America. The biggest reasons the United States had for voting unfavorably towards 
the ICC was that it would violate state sovereignty, that citizens would be subject to laws 
created after an act had already been committed, and that the principle of complementarity, 
though seeming to allow states to retain domestic jurisdiction over its own citizens, allows the 
court to judge a nation’s domestic court system in its decision whether to intervene.  21 states 
abstained from voting.  The Preparatory Commission was given the task of finalizing the 
establishment of the court.  It was always charged with overseeing the smooth function of the 
court by negotiating more documents, such as the Rules and Procedure of Evidence, the 
Financial Regulations, and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the court.  July 
17th is now known as International Justice Day, to commemorate the anniversary of the 
adoption of the Rome Statute. 
The 60th ratification that was necessary to finalize the court was deposited by several states on 
April 11, 2002.  The Assembly of State Parties, which was outlined in the Rome Statute as  
“each State Party shall have one representative in the Assembly who may be accompanied by 
alternates and advisers” and who are given the tasks of consideration and adoption of 
recommendations of the Preparatory Committee as well as providing oversight to the 
President, Prosecutor, and Registrar, met for the first time in September 2002. 
In short, throughout history proposals for an international court have faced criticism.  Ad hoc 
tribunals seemed to be the best course of action for a long time because they allowed more 
powerful nations to try other individuals of other nations, whether those that had lost a war (as 
was the case with Germany’s war criminals post World War II) or those that were simply 
weaker that had committed international crimes (as were the cases of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda).  Yet even the ad hoc tribunals faced numerous criticisms about their 
legitimacy: the legitimacy of the powerful nations trying the weaker ones; the legitimacy of 
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the process in indicting, trying, and sentencing defendants; and the legitimacy of the tribunals’ 
ability to hand down and enforce judgments.  Though initially proposed at the end of the 19th 
century, calls for a permanent court were not seriously considered until the beginning of the 
20th century.  Themes that would carry into the future negotiations on the development of an 
international court began to emerge almost instantly.  The concept of sovereignty has always 
been a customary argument against the creation of a court.  Allowing an outside, international 
party to have jurisdiction over a nation’s citizens was not an appealing idea to most nations.  
Even once complementarity had been taken into account, it was still viewed as a way for the 
ICC to be allowed to judge a nation’s legal system.  Many of these questions and criticisms 
posed both during the period of ad hoc tribunals and the period during and following the 
creation of the ICC are still relevant and are being discussed presently as reasons for not 
signing the Rome Statute, though the United States showed supported and played a major role 
in the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the ICTY, and the ICTR. 
Structure of the Court 
The Court is governed by the Assembly of State Parties, and consists of four judicial organs: 
the judges (Judicial Division), the Presidency, the Prosecutors, and the Registry.   
The Assembly of State Parties acts as the legislative body of the court.  It consists of one 
representative from each state party, each of which has one vote.  It operates using the “every 
effort” method to reach decisions by consensus.  The “every effort” method requires State 
parties to work together to determine the total consensus in the Assembly and in the Bureau.  
If they cannot reach a consensus through collaboration, a two-thirds majority of the present 
voting parties is needed to approve a decision on matters of substance, and a simple majority 
vote is needed for procedural issues.   
The Assembly elects a president and two vice-presidents to preside, each of whom serves a 
three-year term.  The Assembly typically meets once a year, either in New York or in Hague, 
though it may convene in special cases when circumstances call for it.  All of its sessions are 
open to NGOs and observer states.  Duties of the Assembly include electing judges and 
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prosecutors, deciding on the budget of the Court, acting in a legislative manner to adopt texts 
for the Court, providing management oversight to the other bodies of the court, and removing 
judges or prosecutors from office in cases of serious misconduct.  It cannot, however, 
interfere with any of the judicial functions of the court. 
The Judicial Division consists of 18 judges divided amongst the three branches of the Judicial 
Division: the Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Division, and the Appeals Division.  Judges are 
elected members of the ICC.  All judges must be nationals of a state party to the Rome 
Statute, though they can be nominated by any member state, not just their own.  Once elected 
into their divisions, judges sit in Chambers responsible for their various proceedings.  The 
assignments to divisions is determined based on the nature of the division; the qualifications 
and backgrounds of the judges determine which division they are best suited for.  This ensures 
that each judge in each division has the proper balance of both criminal and international law 
expertise.  The first bench was elected in February 2003 and they were sworn in on March 11 
of the same year.  The second bench of judges was elected in January 2006 and also sworn in 
on March 11 of the same year.  On November and December of 2007, three judges were 
elected to replace judges who had resigned.  The most recent election occurred in 2011. 
The office of the Presidency is composed of the President, First Vice-President, and Second 
Vice President.  All three of these offices are elected by an absolute majority of the judges.  
They serve three year renewable terms.  Duties of the President include judicial/legal 
functions, such as assigning cases to Chambers, conducting judicial reviews of decisions of 
the Registry, and finalizing cooperation with member states.  The President is also responsible 
for carrying out the proper administration of the Court.  The President must also oversee the 
work of the Office of the Registry and maintain relations with states, NGOs, and other entities 
to promote awareness of the Court’s works as well as provide information and understanding 
of the Court. 
Article 42 of the Rome Statute deals with the third organ of the court is the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP).  The office is sectioned into three divisions: Prosecutions Division, 
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Investigations Division, and Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division.  The 
OTP is currently involved in investigations in several countries: Northern Uganda; the 
Democratic Republic of Congo; Darfur, Sudan;  the Central African Republic; Kenya; and 
Libya.  Within each of these countries, many individuals are being pursued by the OTP.  The 
office is also involved in preliminary investigations in several countries including 
Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Colombia, Palestine, Honduras, Korea, and 
Nigeria. 
The Office of the Prosecutor is headed by the Prosecutor.  Duties of the person in this position 
include management of the OTP, staff, and facilities of the office.  The Prosecutor may be 
assisted by several Deputy Prosecutors, who must be of different nationalities than the 
Prosecutor.  There is one major criticism about the power of the Prosecutor, however.  
According to the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor “may initiate investigations proprio motu on 
the basis of information on crimes within jurisdiction of the Court.”vi  In essence, the 
Prosecutor can initiate investigations at his discretion.  If the Prosecutor believes a crime has 
been committed that falls within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, he may 
decide to begin an investigation into the incident.  This gives the Prosecutor a large amount of 
power, and it creates a controversy in which some question whether the Prosecutor has too 
much independence. 
The final organ of the ICC, found in Article 43 of the Rome Statute, is the Office of the 
Registry.  This office is responsible for much of the non-judicial servicing of the court.  The 
Office of the Registry is presided over by the Registrar.  The Registrar is the primary 
administrative officer of the Court and functions under the President.  The person holding the 
position of Registrar must meet certain qualifications.  The Registrar must be a person of high 
moral character, with fluency in at least one of the working languages of the Court. 
Jurisdiction of the Court 
International criminal law can be split into two main categories: international and 
transnational. Crimes in the international category are offenses against the global community 
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including human rights violations, war crimes, and genocide. Crimes in the transnational 
category are offenses against one or several nations. These crimes can include drug 
trafficking, counterfeiting, terrorism, and willful damage to the environment. Many of these 
crimes are already covered by UN treaties and charters with the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) serving as the UN’s main judicial structure. The International Court of Justice primarily 
serves as an advisor on legal questions and will settle disputes between states (International). 
Confusing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
can be a common mistake.  They are two separate entities, however.  The International Court 
of Justice differs from the International Criminal Court in several ways. The International 
Criminal Court is set up to prosecute individuals for egregious crimes while the International 
Court of Justice will settle disputes between different states. In the ICJ, “Only states may 
apply to and appear before the court” (International), meaning only nations can submit cases 
for resolution. All members of the UN are automatically members of the ICJ, but they must 
ratify the ICC on their own. International Court of Justice rulings are also subject to the 
enforcement of the UN Security Council which maintains the power to veto any enforcement 
of the rulings.   
The ICC, is legally and functionally independent of the United Nations, yet the Rome Statute 
does grant certain powers to the UN Security Council.  Under Article 13, cases that would not 
normally be considered within the Court’s jurisdiction can be referred to the ICC by the 
Security Council.  The Security Council used this power to refer the cases of Libya and 
Darfur to the Court; these cases would not have normally been considered because neither 
Sudan nor Libya are state parties to the Rome Statute.  The Security Council can also require 
the Court to defer from investigating a case for a period of up to 12 months under Article 16.  
This deferral may be renewed indefinitely by the Security Council, which can be both a 
positive and a negative for the Court.   
This arrangement allows the Court to utilize some of the enforcement powers of the Security 
Council, but it also carries the risk of tainting the Court with the political disagreements and 
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controversies that are prevalent among the members of the Security Council.  The Security 
Council is composed of 5 permanent members and 10 rotating members, each of whom serves 
a two-year term.  China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States comprise the 5 permanent members of the Security Council.  Each of the 5 permanent 
members also has the power to cast a veto to block actions of the other permanent members of 
the Security Council.  These countries are arguably the most powerful in the world, and they 
also conflict with each other frequently.  Relational and political problems can arise when 
countries such as Russia and China veto actions by the United Kingdom, France, and the 
United States, and the Court can feel the effects of this strain through continued renewals of a 
case deferment.   
The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression committed by individuals in a member state 
or committed on member state territory after the ratification of the Rome Statute in July 2002.  
As defined by the Rome Statute, genocide is “…any of the [following] acts committed with 
into to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”vii  It is 
important to note, when speaking about genocide, that the parameters for defining genocide 
do not include acts committed against a political group.  Under this definition, it is acceptable 
to initiate mass violence against an opposing political group, in theory, because it is not 
enumerated as a protected group.  In the past, acts of genocide were tried by ad hoc tribunals, 
such as the Nuremberg Trials and those for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  Crimes 
against humanity are defined as “…any of the [following] acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack.”viii  Prior to any semblance of international law and rules of warfare, it was 
perfectly acceptable to target civilians and combatants alike during wartime.  Since the 
development of international law, civilians have become a more protected class, who are to be 
free of direct and intentional attacks by enemy combatants.  If large groups of civilians were 
to be targeted specifically during a time of war, it would be deemed as crimes against 
humanity.  War crimes, “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of 
Unsigning the Rome Statute: Examining the Relationship Between the United States and 
the International Criminal Court 
Senior Capstone Project for Allison Naylor 
- 12 - 
a large-scale commission of such crimes,”ix include torture, grave mistreatment of prisoners 
of war (POWs), the taking of hostages, purposefully causing great suffering to the body, and 
the willful destruction of property not justified as an act of military necessity. 
Throughout most of world history, to the victor went the spoils.  It was commonplace for the 
winning country to take property—land, gold, and other material objects—from not only 
combatants, but also from civilians, of the losing side.  It was also common for the winning 
side to punish the entire country of the losing side, not just those who were actually fighting 
in the war.  For example, at the conclusion of World War I, the entirety of Germany was 
forced to pay reparations to the allied forces.  The entire country was being punished for the 
actions of the government and the military.   The creation of ad hoc tribunals at the end of 
World War II marked the beginning of a different era in international law.  Now, the allied 
forces could punish those directly responsible, rather than punishing the entire population for 
the actions of a few.  It is the same principle in the International Criminal Court.  The Court 
puts individuals on trial for their crimes, though finding where to draw the line of 
responsibility can be difficult.  Generally, the Court only tries the highest ranking officials 
responsible for the committed crimes.  For example, the ICC is currently investigating the 
situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda.  Currently, 
arrest warrants have only been issued to 5 senior officials: leader Joseph Kony; Kony’s 
deputy, Vincent Otti; Army Commander of the LRA, Okot Odiambo; LRA commander, 
Raska Lukwiya; and LRA commander, Dominic Ongwen.  Though thousands of others are 
involved in this particular situation, the ICC is only interested in trying the top officials, as 
there are far too many people to try individually and the trials would take too long. 
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PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT FROM AMERICA’S PERSPECTIVE 
The Threat of Third Party Jurisdiction and Anti-American Sentiment 
One of the primary concerns raised by America when writing the Rome Statute and then 
signing it was the idea of third-party jurisdiction.  Particularly in the United States, where 
sovereignty and freedom are prized above all other concepts, the idea of a third-party having 
jurisdiction over the way in which leaders and militaries acts was a harrowing thought.  The 
United States is a powerful country with military presence throughout the world.  It is also a 
powerful country with many enemies in this world.  One of the major fears of American 
leaders was that American troops overseas, particularly those acting in “peace-enforcement, 
peacekeeping, rescue of nationals, freedom of navigation, and anti-terrorism,”x could be 
subject to this jurisdiction if a vengeful state chose to act in an ill-manner and refer the United 
States to the Court.  According to former Yale University Professor of Law, Ruth Wedgwood, 
“The worry of the United States is that in an unpopular conflict, there is a real chance that an 
adversary or critic will choose to misuse the ICC to make its point.”xi  Particularly with an 
powerful, elected Prosecutor, it is possible that states that are not on friendly terms with the 
United States would band together to elect Prosecutor with anti-American leanings. 
There were, however, solutions proposed to this problem of third-party jurisdiction.  One of 
the proposed solutions was to “suspend third-party jurisdiction where the state is willing to 
assume responsibility for the conduct as official acts,”xii a concept known as 
complementarity.  Essentially, if criminal acts were committed, complementarity allows the 
nation state in question to have the opportunity to try the case first.  Complementarity would 
allow the United States to try its own citizens, or perpetrators who committed illegal acts on 
American soil, in the American judicial system first.  This would afford the accused all of the 
rights and protections of the Constitution and allow the United States to retain jurisdiction 
over American crimes.  If the United States took advantage of this privilege, the case need 
never be heard in front of the ICC.  If the state acted to try the individuals responsible, they 
would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC.  The ICC would only step if the United 
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States did not try the accused or if the trial appeared fraudulent or fixed in any way.  This plan 
of action would not exempt government personnel from the justice system, but would rather 
protect the nation state from forfeiting its right to try its own people to an international body. 
The other solution for the United States to protect itself from the jurisdiction of the Court 
would be to use its power of being on the Security Council.  As mentioned, the Security 
Council has the power to defer the Court’s investigation for a period of up to 12 months.  
Furthermore, the Security Council can vote for this deferral for an indefinite number of 
renewals.  The United States can use its position to indefinitely defer any investigations into 
its own affairs.  This would give the United States time to fully investigate the issue, decide 
the best course of action, and, if deemed necessary, try the issue without worrying about ICC 
interference.  Admittedly, the U.S. would need the support of other Security Council 
Members; America would surely block a nation’s desire to refer an investigation of U.S. 
actions, while other Security Council members would likewise be able to block deferments of 
investigations against the U.S.  This could turn this into a point of U.S. contention with Court.   
It could be argued that this power could also be dangerous if the United States were to abuse 
it in any way, such as utilizing it as a preventative action to keep its troops from ever facing 
the Court.  That being said, the United States has a reputation that it needs to uphold, and the 
likelihood of the United States abusing this power seems small given the international 
backlash it would face if it were to do so.  These kinds of actions could taint the United 
States’ image, particularly to those whom the United States chose not to defer ICC 
investigations, whether ally or non-ally.  For allies, it could negatively impact the positive 
relationship forged between the two countries; for non-allies, it could be used as a rallying 
point for anti-American sentiment.   It is more likely that the United States would utilize this 
power to prepare a trial for its own citizens, given the lengthy trial process in the United 
States. 
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The Problem of Constitutionality 
Constitutional arguments have been made against the signing of the Rome Statute.  It is 
unclear whether the Constitution allows the U.S. government to delegate judicial authority to 
an outside third party—in other words, to delegate jurisdiction over Americans or acts 
committed on American soil to an international body.  A precedent seems to have been set in 
the case Ex parte Milliganxiii. In this case, the Supreme Court struck down the conviction of a 
civilian by a military tribunal that was not established under Article III of the Constitution.  
The only way, it would seem, to bypass this issue would require at minimum that judges be 
appointed by the President, approved by the Senate, and serve for life.  Even still, many other 
Constitutional problems would arise that would prevent the United States from accepting the 
jurisdiction of the ICC over American citizens as legitimate. 
Procedurally, according to Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin, Jr., the ICC would fail to 
provide Americans the rights they are guaranteed under the Constitution.  These would 
include rights guaranteed by the 4th Amendment, 5th Amendment, 6th Amendment, and the 8th 
Amendment in particular.  In De Geofroy v. Riggs (1890), the Supreme Court ruled that 
Constitutional rights of Americans cannot be abridged by the federal government’s power to 
conclude treaties.  To quote, they claimed, “[W]e do not make the laws of war but we respect 
them so far as they do not conflict with the commands of Congress or the Constitution.”xiv  
Clearly, then, one can see the difficulty in approving a court that goes against many of the 
ideals of the American way of life set forth by the Constitution.  Though provided some 
protections under the Rome Statute, Americans on trial would not have the protections and 
rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, including protection from double jeopardy, the 
right to confront the accuser, and the right to a trial by jury.  Furthermore, though the trials in 
the ICC are supposed to be public, the proceedings are often private.  Exceptions to the public 
trial have never been enumerated in detail, however.  It could be argued that this is a denial of 
a public trial that Americans would enjoy under the Constitution. 
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Some rights are granted to those on trial in the ICC, though not necessarily the same rights 
enumerated in the American Constitution.  The Rome Statute’s Article 24 “Non-retroactivity 
ratione personae,”xv criminal acts committed before the enactment of the treaty are not 
subject to ICC investigation.  This protects people from punishment by ex post facto laws.  
Also under this article, if a law were to be changed before a final judgment was handed down, 
the law that is more favorable to the person on trial will be applied.   This protects the accused 
from having a harsher punishment handed down as a result of a law change undertaken during 
the course of the trial.  Under Article 26 of the Rome Statute, no person under the age of 18 at 
the time the crime was committed shall be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.  Article 31 
directly enumerates protection of those who suffer from mental diseases that prevent them 
from understanding their actions and the corresponding consequences.  This same article 
allows people to act in self-defense—either through physical defending or the taking of 
property that is essential to survival—from “imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner 
proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or property 
protected”xvi without punishment from the Court.  Article 31also protects those whose actions 
were the result of duress under threat of imminent death or bodily harm against that person or 
another person.  Though the Court does offer these protections, it still does not offer the same 
standard of protection American citizens have come to enjoy under the American 
Constitution.xvii 
Article III of the Constitution also states, “The trial of all crimes, except in cases of 
impeachment, shall be by jury and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes 
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such 
place or places as the Congress may by law have directed”xviii  As mentioned when discussing 
the structure of the court, all trials in the ICC would be heard in front of a bench of judges; 
there is no jury in the ICC.  Should the United States fail to try the case within its own 
borders, any American tried before the ICC would, by default, forfeit his Constitutional right 
to a trial by jury.  Further, the trial would not be held within the state the crime has been 
committed, but rather at the ICC headquarters in the Netherlands.    
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The United States’ initial signing of the treaty allowed the United States to play a significant 
role in the shaping of the court and its guiding principles. It gave the United States power in 
determining the direction of the court. During the preliminary discussions and the creation of 
the Rome Statute, the United States was always very mindful about the potential 
Constitutional impact.  U.S. delegates questioned each portion of the Rome Statute in terms of 
how it fit with the U.S. Constitution.  Though the Rome Statutes was initially deemed to have 
met the criteria of the Constitutional test in terms of the rights of the accused according David 
Scheffer, head of the U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference (incidentally, he ended up 
voting against the adoption of the treaty), the United State proceeded to unsign the statute 
under President Bush.   
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE COURT  
Clinton Administration 
 
Though hesitant and filled with concerns, President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute on 
December 31, 2000.  President Clinton signed the statute in order to, “…reaffirm our strong 
support for international accountability and for bringing to justice perpetrators of genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity”xix.  Clinton also wanted to, “…remain engaged in 
making the ICC an instrument of impartial and effective justice in the years to come”xx.  
Clinton signed the Rome Statute with the hope of being involved in the process of creating the 
court and influencing its growth.  It is important to note that signing the statute was not the 
same as ratifying it, however.  Though he had signed the statute, the document still had to be 
reviewed and ratified by Congress before the United States could become a full state party to 
the Rome Statute.  Clinton signed the document, but he did not submit it to Congress before 
his final term was complete. 
Clinton did not believe that the Court should retain jurisdiction in states that had not ratified 
the Rome Statute.  He believed “Court jurisdiction over U.S. personnel should come only with 
U.S. ratification of the treaty”xxi.  Clinton only wanted to be part to the continued creation of 
the court, not to the actual jurisdiction of the court.  Furthermore, he did not want U.S. 
peacekeepers and soldiers in nations signed on to the Court to be subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction, particularly if the Rome Statute had not gone through the ratification process in 
the U.S. Congress.  During this point in time, the United States had begun taking a stronger 
interest in humanitarian efforts across the world, potentially subjecting the United States to 
the jurisdiction of the Court.   
Clinton even went so far as to suggest that his successor—President George W. Bush—should 
not submit the treaty for ratification until all American concerns had been addressed. Clinton 
held the view that signing the Rome Statute would allow the United States to be involved in 
shaping the Court, without actually being subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.  America was 
concerned that the ICC would interfere with domestic judicial systems and that the Prosecutor 
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only be allowed to take action against an alleged criminal if the country of nationality is 
unwilling to investigate and try the crimes.  The United States was also concerned that the 
Court would not only take jurisdiction over states that have signed the statute, but also those 
that had not.  He acknowledged, however, that if the United States did not sign the treaty, it 
would not have the ability to influence the development of the Court. 
Under the Rome Statute, the United States would be protected in various ways that countered 
President Clinton’s hesitance. The Statute focused more on broad war crimes and crimes 
against humanity and would likely ignore smaller issues created by individual soldiers.xxii The 
United States, as a Security Council member, would have also been able to stop the ICC from 
investigating and trying their soldiers involved in U.N. Peacekeeping Missionsxxiii by using 
the power to defer investigations. The idea of complementarity would also allow the United 
States to try their own citizens in their courts first before they would ever appear before the 
ICC.xxiv The Rome Statute did allow some protections for the United States which eventually 
led to President Clinton’s initial signing of the treaty at the end of the year 2000. 
Overall, there appears to be a general trend for Clinton’s reasons to sign the Rome Statute. 
Despite some reservations regarding provisions within the Rome Statute Clinton decided to 
sign and commit the United States. The decision allowed the United States to become a part 
of the creation of the court without having to commit to its jurisdiction. Clinton wanted to 
position the United States as helping the international community in setting up the court but 
also gave the United States the flexibility to back out if they believed the court was not in 
their best interests. Clinton never put the United States into the Court completely, but rather 
entered into the Rome Statute with reservations that he expected his successor to discuss and 
negotiate before the ratification of the Statute.   
Bush Administration 
 
The United States’ approach to the International Criminal Court took a very different turn 
under Clinton’s successor, President George W. Bush. President Bush sought to limit the 
International Criminal Court’s influence over the United States and sought to limit its 
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jurisdiction. President Bush even removed the United States’ signature from the Rome 
Statute, eliminating their adherence to the treaty. Under the Bush administration the United 
States took aggressive measures in order to minimize the presence of the ICC. 
The timing of Clinton’s signature on the Rome Statute was one of the major issues the Bush 
administration had with the treaty. President Clinton signed the Rome Statute on December 
31, 2000, less than one month before President Bush was to be inaugurated and take office. 
Clinton made recommendations to President Bush in his statement on the Rome Statute but 
failed consult him.xxv  President Bush’s attitude towards the Rome Statute was that the United 
States should not be a part of the International Criminal Court.xxvi  Participation in the Statute 
was minimal and was not a priority of the Bush Administration until the 60th nation ratified 
the ICC on April 11, 2002.  This event signaled that the ICC would, in fact, have enough 
support to become an operating institution.xxvii  Less than a month later, the Bush 
Administration sent notice to the United Nations that, “the United States has no legal 
obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000.”xxviii 
The administration’s actions towards the International Criminal Court became more focused 
on limiting the Court’s power over Americans. The United States exercised its Security 
Council veto over peacekeeping missions in Bosnia until the other Security Council members 
passed, “…a resolution limiting the ICC’s power to prosecute U.S. peacekeepers.”xxix   In this 
case, U.S. peacekeepers were stationed in Bosnia and the U.S. threatened to veto the 
extension of peacekeeping missions in Security Council until the Council passed a resolution 
to shield US Peacekeepers from ICC prosecution.  In addition, there were other bilateral 
agreements set up by the United States. This sought to prevent the extradition of American 
citizens to the ICC using the threat of revocation of aid as incentive.xxx  This was done to 
protect American citizens on the basis of Article 98 of the Rome Statute.  This article allowed 
nations to cooperate with treaties in place in regards to diplomatic immunity of a third party 
instead of their responsibilities under the Rome Statute.xxxi   
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Bush also signed into law the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) in 2002. 
This act sought to protect the United States’ military and government officials from ICC 
prosecution.xxxii  This act required the Security Council to exempt United States armed forces 
from ICC jurisdiction in any United Nations peacekeeping missions. That act also authorized 
the President to, “…use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any 
person…who is being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the 
International Criminal Court.”xxxiii  The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act allowed 
the United States to take any means necessary to stop United States citizens from ICC 
prosecution. 
The Bush Administration’s strong anti-ICC actions were critical in the United States’ 
unsigning of the treaty. The United States took aggressive actions to not only free themselves 
of their commitment to the Rome Statute, but to limit the ICC’s influence and jurisdiction 
over Americans. According to John R. Bolton, the Bush administration was fearful that top 
military officials, government leaders, United States’ U.N. peacekeepers, and civilians would 
become, “…the real potential targets of the ICC’s politically unaccountable Prosecutor.”xxxiv  
The Bush administration feared an unaccountable International Criminal Court that would be 
free to prosecute whomever it deemed criminal. The Clinton Administration’s actions of 
signing the Rome Statute without consulting the new administration only exacerbated 
President Bush’s distaste towards the International Criminal Court. This culminated with the 
unsigning of the treaty and aggressive anti-ICC policies by the United States.  Later in his 
presidency, Bush softened a little about enforcing these laws.  In 2005, the United States 
abstained from the UN Security Council recommendation to investigate Sudan.  Though 
America did not directly support the measure, the fact that it did not veto the recommendation 
was viewed as some measure of support for the concept of the ICC.   
Obama Administration 
 
President Barack Obama has closely followed some of his policies towards the international 
Criminal Court as President Bush did before him. While not as aggressively cutting all ties 
with the ICC the Obama Administration has still felt the need to maintain distance between 
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the ICC and Americans.  It is worth acknowledging, however, that President Obama is viewed 
as much more supportive of the Court in part because he is less unilateral than President Bush 
was while he was in office. 
The Obama Administration closely followed the Bush Administration’s previous policies with 
the referral of Mummar el-Qaddafi to the ICC. In 2005, the Bush Administration demanded a 
paragraph in the referral of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to the ICC exempting United 
States personnel from investigation (Hirsh). The Obama Administration demanded the same 
exemption in Qaddafi’s referral before it would allow the referral to pass the UN Security 
Council. The clause “…declares that the United States will retain ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ over 
its own personnel” (Hirsh).  However, in 2011, the United States voted in favor of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1970 which was concerned with the situation in with Qaddafi in 
Libya.  This marked the first time in which a UN referral to the ICC had been unanimously 
decided upon.xxxv  This yes vote to recommend Sudan contrasted with President Bush’s 
Administration who abstained on the previous vote.  The Obama Administration has also 
supported the ICC in other ways most notably through the supplying of intelligence on 
Darfur.xxxvi   
So far over the course of Obama’s Presidency, he has softened the United States’ stance 
against the ICC. Despite maintaining the ICC lacks jurisdiction over United States citizens he 
has sought to aid it through the supply of information in order to stop war criminals. Obama 
appears to support the idea of an international body to try and convict the most heinous of war 
criminals, but still wants to put Americans above the ICC. Obama’s actions have only 
continued to distance the United States from ICC jurisdiction. Obama has been more amicable 
towards the ICC but the fear remains that Americans will be unfairly targeted by the ICC. 
Obama’s attempt to shield Americans from ICC jurisdiction exemplifies this.  
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ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE 
COURT 
The relationship between the United States and the International Criminal Court is an 
important one in determining the future of the Court.  The United States is among the most 
powerful countries in the world given its resources and its UN Security Council position.  The 
Court needs the United States to volunteer these assets as well as its support in order to be 
viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the international community.  Without support from the 
United States, the Court will fail or, at the very least, cease to be effective in fulfilling its 
purpose. 
The Court faces a problem in being able to capture those it has brought indictments against.  It 
has no police force or military force to bring these people into the Court, and it does not have 
the power to try people in abstentia, or without the accused physically in the courtroom.  It 
relies on countries using their own military and police forces to capture the criminals and 
hand them over to the court.  The United States has the most powerful military in the world to 
accomplish this task, either as a member of the UN or on its own.  Furthermore, the United 
States can utilize its connection to NATO to accomplish tasks that it may not have been able 
to through the UN due to vetoes by other Security Council members.  It also can use its 
influence as a superpower to get countries to turn over accused criminals to the ICC.   
Currently, no country signed on to the Rome Statute seems to have the capability or the will 
to offer what the United States could offer in way of either capturing accused criminals or 
influencing nations to hand them over.  Without this kind of cooperation, the Court will 
hardly ever hear cases, as there will be few defendants present for trials.  The Court will, 
therefore, fail in its goal of trying those potentially responsible for some of the world’s most 
heinous crimes.  If the Court has no cases to try because it has no way to bring people to their 
trials, it becomes an ineffective legal structure with no legitimacy and no purpose. 
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The United States can also offer its position on the UN Security Council to bring legitimacy 
and effectiveness to the Court.  The United States can use its position to refer important cases 
to the Court.  Cases such as those of Sudan and Libya would not have made it to the ICC 
without UN referral. The United States could also work to prevent indefinite deferrals of 
important cases.  Possessing such a powerful voice on the Security Council, U.S. influence 
would help bring legitimacy to the Court.   Furthermore, U.S. influence on the UN Security 
Council could help solve the problem of capturing criminals and enforcing decisions, through 
direct intervention, influencing other countries to get involved, and influencing the home 
country to extradite its criminals. 
The Court also needs funding in order to operate.  It currently operates on the contributions of 
member states, and the amount that each member state pays corresponds with that country’s 
income, similar to how the UN is funded.  The Court can also get funding through the UN if it 
is approved by the General Assembly and is to be used in relation to a case referred to the 
Court by the Security Council.  The United States is among the wealthiest countries in the 
world with the most resources.  America provides approximately 22% of the entire UN 
budget.  With funding from America, the Court could develop further and it would have the 
resources to work towards capturing criminals.  The amount of funding America could 
provide could potentially make the Court a much higher functioning institution.  Further, by 
contributing money to the Court, the United States will play a pivotal role in the development 
and furthering of the Court; though there are many things the United States does not 
particularly like about the Court, it cannot change the Court if it decides to stay away from the 
Court.  It is a generally accepted concept that nations with the most resources to contribute are 
those who have the most influence in shaping an institution.  This could be the case with the 
United States if it were to not only sign on to the Court, but also begin to fund the Court. 
Most importantly, the influence of the United States on the international stage can either make 
or break the Court.  If the United States continues to not only not support the Court, but also 
campaign against it, the Court will fail.  If the United States, the most powerful nation in the 
world, does not want to sign on to the Court, other nations will question why they should.  
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Others may also follow suit, withdrawing from the Court and unsigning the Rome Statute, 
particularly if lack of U.S. support impacts the ability of the ICC to function effectively. Lack 
of effective functioning may discourage members, who may unsign the treaty due to lack of 
progress.  If no nations are member parties to the Court, the Court will have no jurisdiction 
and will thus be an ineffective court with no power and no reason for existing.  The Court will 
be dismantled if the United States uses its influence to persuade others away from the Court.   
However, as the ICC exists now, it is not in U.S. interests to join.  Though many of the United 
States’ European allies signed on to the measure, the United States itself is not as willing to 
forfeit some of its sovereignty and submit itself to third-party jurisdiction.  One could make 
the argument that the United States gave up some sovereignty when it decided to join 
international governmental organizations such as the UN, but I would disagree.  In bodies 
such as the UN, the United States was placed in a powerful position.  It has a great deal of 
sway and influence in UN matters as a member of the Security Council, rather than simply 
being a General Assembly member.  It has powers that most other countries do not.  If the 
United States were to join the Court, it would not be placed in that powerful and advantageous 
position.  Rather, it would be just as vulnerable and subject to investigation as other states 
signed on to the Court.  In this way, the United States does not want to forfeit its sovereignty 
because there would be no opportunity to really gain anything in terms of power or influence 
in signing on.  Instead, the United States would be placed on the same playing field as all of 
the other members, unless the Prosecutor somehow managed to always be from the United 
States, which would be a highly unlikely scenario given the number of countries signed on to 
the Statute.  The United States wants the ability to be in control of every situation or 
international body, but there is little opportunity for that to occur in the Court. 
Furthermore, the potential infringement on constitutionally guaranteed rights far outweighs 
the benefits of an International Criminal Court in the minds of many American politicians.  I 
would also contend that the United States would end up bearing most of the burden of 
capturing and extraditing alleged criminals to the ICC, which would involve significant 
American funding coming out of the American taxpayers’ pocket.  The number of countries 
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possessing anti-American sentiment is also high right now, creating even more objection to 
subjecting the U.S. to the Court’s jurisdiction.   
Using this logic, however, I would argue that the United States would never sign on to any 
kind of international court of which it could be subjected to outside jurisdiction.  It partially 
has to do with the way in which the Court is set up with the elected judges and Prosecutor, but 
it also stems from the tradition of American emphasis on individual rights and freedoms, as 
well as a need to be in control of every situation.  The United States wants to be involved in 
shaping and developing the court, as well as prosecuting criminals, yet it does not want to be 
on the receiving end of the court’s jurisdiction, similar to the American role in the Nuremberg 
trials.  Should this ideal ever become a reality, the court would never be viewed as illegitimate 
internationally anyway since only certain people would be subject to its jurisdiction.  Perhaps, 
then, the United States will never sign on to any international court unless there is a drastic 
change in the court’s structure and American ideals. 
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